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Interoception can be broadly defined as the sense of signals originating within the body.
As such, interoception is critical for our sense of embodiment, motivation, and well-
being. And yet, despite its importance, interoception remains poorly understood within
modern science. This paper reviews interdisciplinary perspectives on interoception, with
the goal of presenting a unified perspective from diverse fields such as neuroscience,
clinical practice, and contemplative studies. It is hoped that this integrative effort will
advance our understanding of how interoception determines well-being, and identify
the central challenges to such understanding. To this end, we introduce an expanded
taxonomy of interoceptive processes, arguing that many of these processes can be
understood through an emerging predictive coding model for mind–body integration.
The model, which describes the tension between expected and felt body sensation,
parallels contemplative theories, and implicates interoception in a variety of affective and
psychosomatic disorders. We conclude that maladaptive construal of bodily sensations
may lie at the heart of many contemporary maladies, and that contemplative practices
may attenuate these interpretative biases, restoring a person’s sense of presence and
agency in the world.
Keywords: interoception, contemplative practice, meditation, body awareness, mindfulness, yoga, mind–body
therapies
Introduction
Introducing Interoception
Interoception is the process of receiving, accessing and appraising internal bodily signals.
Maintaining desired physiological states is critical for an organism’s survival, and so
interoception is a powerful motivator of behavior in the pursuit of these states (Craig, 2002,
2009). While interoceptive awareness has been more narrowly deﬁned as the representation
of aﬀerent body sensations (Craig, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004), broader deﬁnitions cast
interoception as a multi-dimensional construct that also takes into account how people
attend to, appraise and respond to these sensations (Vaitl, 1996; Cameron, 2001; Verdejo-
Garcia et al., 2012). Interoception is supported by an increasingly well-speciﬁed neuro-
anatomical pathway with dedicated representation cortices akin to the ﬁve external senses
(Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004; Critchley and Harrison, 2013), although the nature of
such representation is decidedly more mysterious and in need of empirical investigation.
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Interoception is an iterative process, requiring the interplay
between perception of body states and cognitive appraisal of
these states to inform response selection. Aﬀerent sensory
signals continuously interact with higher order cognitive
representations of goals, history, and environment, informing
emotional experience and motivating regulatory behavior (Craig,
2009). Together, these iterations create a sense of self laden
with motivational context (Damasio, 2003b). Such context may
then inform a person’s approach or avoidance tendencies, and
thus these interactions hold important implications for well-
being (Beck, 2008). Conversely, life experience impinges upon
interoception: the perceived availability and relevance of body
representations are moderated by factors such as attentional cues
(Ainley et al., 2012), contemplative training such as meditation,
yoga, tai chi, etc. (Bornemann et al., 2014), and age (Khalsa et al.,
2009). Understanding how interoceptive processing is shaped by
experience is therefore important for eﬀorts to cultivate well-
being and stress resilience.
Interoception and Well-Being
One reason that interoception, a perceptual capacity, is
introduced in relation to well-being is that it is thought to be
intimately connected to self-regulation, having likely evolved
to help organisms maintain homeostasis (Paulus, 2007; Herbert
and Pollatos, 2012; Craig, 2013; Gu and Fitzgerald, 2014).
In modern life, emotionally valenced body signals are also
thought to contribute to broader mood states that support
emotional balance (Paulus and Stein, 2006; Craig, 2007; Seth,
2013). To the extent that a person is sensitive to interoceptive
signals, such signals guide decision making (Dunn et al., 2010).
And yet, high sensitivity is not without its price: when body
sensation is irregular, as for individuals with joint hypermobility,
greater interoceptive sensation may also contribute to feelings
of anxiety (Mallorquí-Bagué et al., 2014). Thus, interoceptive
sensitivity may either contribute or detract from well-being,
suggesting a need for guidance in regulating salient visceral
signals.
Paralleling the ﬁndings of modern secular clinical science,
contemplative science suggests that reﬂection on interoceptive
processes is important for adaptive behavior (Wallace, 2007),
disrupting overlearned perceptual, and interpretive habits
formed throughout cognitive development and aligning behavior
with higher-order intentions (Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). As
the embodied self is more fully realized through awareness of
ongoing interoceptive interactions, two complimentary senses
emerge: presence, one’s connection to the moment, and agency,
one’s ability to eﬀect change, which are both foundational
in determining a person’s sense of well-being (Seth et al.,
2011). To chart interoception’s salutary relevance, research
must therefore consider the integration of both early sensory
and later aﬀective discriminations into a broader motivational
context.
Motivation for the Present Paper
Over the past decade, the mechanisms of interoceptive
awareness, the importance of interoceptive cues for physical and
psychological health, and the cultivation of healthy interoceptive
habits through contemplative practices have become topics
of active investigation. However, insights from these three
domains are rarely integrated, impeding the progression of
understanding their collective signiﬁcance. In April 2013,
the authors met to discuss interoception across a variety
of perspectives – including neuroscience, social and clinical
psychology, complementary and alternative care, medicine,
Buddhist and contemplative studies, and a wealth of personal
experiences with contemplative practices. Our goal is to better
explain how interoceptive information can be revealed and
masked from conscious awareness, how our appraisals of a
given level of interoceptive awareness help to determine well-
being, and what role contemplative practices may play in these
processes.
Here, we attempt to integrate contemporary interoceptive
theory from these diverse perspectives, in the hope of better
specifying interoceptive constructs and identifying next steps for
advancing the ﬁeld. First, we deﬁne interoception from scientiﬁc
and contemplative perspectives, focusing on a predictive coding
model of interoceptive representation that is growing in
popularity within the scientiﬁc community. Second, we discuss
the role of interoception for physical and psychological well-
being, with particular regard for emerging clinical evidence.
Third, we explore how contemplative practices may interact with
interoceptive processes to enhance well-being in oneself and
connection to others. Finally, we summarize outstanding issues in
the study of interoception and oﬀer recommendations for future
research.
Interoception in Psychology,
Neuroscience, and Contemplative
Traditions
Toward a Science of Interoception
The scientiﬁc study of brain, mind, and body provides
a framework for objectively modeling interoception.
Neuroanatomical studies have identiﬁed pathways that
support and modulate interoceptive representations, and
as such, may be measurably impacted by psychopathology
or contemplative practice. This framework is comprised
of peripheral receptors, C-ﬁber aﬀerents, spinothalamic
projections, speciﬁc thalamic nuclei, posterior and anterior
insula as the limbic sensory cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) as the limbic motor cortex (Vaitl, 1996; Bush et al., 2000;
Vuilleumier, 2005; Critchley and Harrison, 2013). In some cases,
deﬁnitions of interoception extend beyond visceral aﬀerents
(Sherrington, 1906) to include aﬀerents from other deep body
receptors, such as C-tactile somatic receptors of the skin that
are associated with internal feelings of warmth or pleasure from
gentle touch (Björnsdotter et al., 2009), circulating chemicals,
proprioceptive inputs, and unexpected or yet unknown sites,
such as recently discovered photoreceptor cells within the eyes
(Lucas, 2013).
The anatomical pathways for interoception are well-speciﬁed,
detailing the connections between sensory receptors, spinal
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cord, brainstem, and brain (Craig, 2002). Neurotransmitter
concentrations in the insula and ACC in particular have
been associated with subjective interoceptive awareness and
subjective well-being (Ernst et al., 2014; Wiebking et al., 2014).
However, how such neural representations are constructed
and the mechanisms by which they inﬂuence cognition
remain unclear. Most investigations have focused narrowly
on interoceptive awareness, which may only be one aspect of
interoceptive processing. Interrelated but distinct constructs
such as interoceptive attention tendency, sensitivity, coherence
between physiology and subjective experience, accuracy, and
regulatory habits may all emerge as important properties
of information propagation and integration throughout
interoceptive networks (Box 1).
Adding to the complexity, multiple interoceptive sub-systems
operate concurrently, and may each aﬀord diﬀerent capacities
and tendencies. There is some evidence for general, multimodal
interoceptive capacity: heartbeat detection accuracy is correlated
with gastric sensitivity (Herbert et al., 2012b), and sometimes
with pain sensitivity in some studies (Pollatos et al., 2012), but not
with others (Werner et al., 2009). Furthermore, the relationship
between interoceptive constructs across domains such as the
heartbeat, blood glucose, respiration, temperature and other
modalities is largely unknown. This gap in understanding may
be due to the fact that most interoception studies gage accuracy
within a single modality, and do not measure related constructs
such as attention habits, regulation ability, or sensitivity to signal
change, all of which converge to support interoceptive awareness
(Ceunen et al., 2013).
Acknowledgment of interoception’s multimodal and
multifaceted nature is important, because consideration of these
factors in isolation can lead to spurious inferences. For example,
knowledge that meditators have strong interoceptive attention
tendencies might lead one to expect them also to possess superior
accuracy in heartbeat detection, an idea contradicted by recent
research on this topic (Khalsa et al., 2008; Parkin et al., 2013). The
beneﬁts of interoceptive attention in a particular domain such
as breath or body monitoring therefore seem to be independent
from a domain-general enhancement of interoceptive accuracy.
Instead, meditation practices appears to promote changes in a
BOX 1 | A taxonomy of interoception terms.
Interoception has been generally construed as the representation of the individual’s body at a particular point in time (Craig, 2002), but accounts differ on how
interoceptive capacity should be measured. Similar to a recently proposed model (Garfinkel and Critchley, 2013), we suggest several criteria to supplement the
measurement of interoception:
• Interoceptive awareness, such as the sense of one’s heart beating, is the most common measure of interoception, and is usually operationalized in terms of the
reportability of interoceptive signals. However, awareness may be a limited criterion, as interoceptive processes may operate implicitly, such as thermoregulation
promoting shivering even when one is asleep (Craig, 2003).
• Coherence between physiological and subjective states measures the degree to which objectively observable interoceptive signals manifest in reportable experience.
For example, low blood sugar (hypoglycemia) is characterized both by interoceptive signals (Herbert et al., 2012a) and irritability (Matthew et al., 1997). However,
awareness of low blood sugar is not necessary for it to promote irritability (Taylor and Rachman, 1988; Matthew et al., 1997). Coherence appears to vary widely
among individuals, even though both are impacted by environmental stressors (Sze et al., 2010).
• Attention tendency refers to whether a person habitually attends to particular interoceptive signals, potentially inhibiting or ignoring others (Pollatos et al., 2005). It
can also be expressed as whether a person attends more to interoceptive than exteroceptive sources of information.
• Sensitivity refers to the minimum threshold for detecting interoceptive signal change (Holzl et al., 1996); sensitivity may operate at multiple levels of the
representational system, culminating in access to conscious awareness. Although not often used in interoception research, specificity is the common counterpart to
sensitivity in signal detection theory (Abdi, 2007), the ability to reject competing signals from being classified as interoceptive afferent signals.
• Accuracy is perhaps the most commonly investigated measure of interoception, and refers to the ability to reliably discriminate interoceptive signals from noise or
competing signals (Vaitl, 1996), and between different levels of signal intensity (Daubenmier et al., 2013). It appears that accuracy varies widely between individuals
(Critchley et al., 2004; Ceunen et al., 2013), but may improve with focused training (Brener, 1977; Daubenmier et al., 2013; Mirams et al., 2013). Accuracy is usually
thought to be a function of sensitivity and specificity.
• Sensibility refers to an individual’s personal account of how they experience internal sensations, including a confidence estimate of one’s own interoceptive ability
and feelings of engagement during interoception (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Sensibility is often gaged using interviews and/or questionnaires, frequently the Porges Body
Perception Questionnaire (Porges, 1993) is applied. The usefulness of this instrument for interoception, however, has been questioned as it appears to primarily
serve as a proxy measure for anxiety-related symptoms (Mehling et al., 2009). The Scale of Body Connection (Price and Thompson, 2007) and the Multidimensional
Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2012) were created in part to help extend interoceptive assessment.
• Regulation refers to how well a person can match an interoceptive signal to his or her desired state. Regulation can involve shaping either the signal or the desire.
For example, regulation could shape interoceptive signals to meet goals through reappraisal, suppression, or distraction, techniques often cited in modern scientific
models of emotion regulation (Gross, 2002). However, regulation could also follow more contemplative traditions, intentionally accepting and examining such signals
with curiosity, a strategy that encourages shifts in interoceptive experience without attempting to control unexpected interoceptive signals or create desirable ones.
Concurrent measurement of these constructs may inform a more complete model of interoception, its relationship to well-being, and the effects of contemplative
training
It is important to note that these constructs have varied definitions across the literature. Sensitivity and accuracy are combined as interoceptive accuracy in a
recent interoception model (Garfinkel et al., 2015), measured as the performance on objective behavioral tests such as the heartbeat detection task, and clearly
distinguished from interoceptive awareness and interoceptive sensibility. In the Garfinkel et al. (2015, p. 65) model, interoceptive awareness has been operationalized
as “metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy, e.g. confidence-accuracy correspondence.” However, the term metacognitive awareness is also a term
commonly used in contemplative practice pointing to the possibility of taking awareness itself and the process of thinking as an object of attention and has been
defined elsewhere as the ability to reflect or be aware of ongoing thought or mental states (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Epel et al., 2009). There, it has been
defined as the ability to experience negative thoughts and feelings as mental events that pass through the mind, rather than as a part of the self (Herbert and Forman,
2011). We would therefore avoid using the term “metacognitive awareness” to mean confidence–accuracy correspondence, preferring the term coherence instead.
Thus, the terms listed above represent an attempt to bring a common taxonomy to our discussion, but should not be read as universally definitive in this developing
field of inquiry.
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more speciﬁc subset of interoceptive capacities and tendencies,
accompanied by non-interoceptive factors such as changes in
intentions or goal-orientations unique to each system of practice
(Bornemann et al., 2014).
Just as capacity may vary across interoceptive modalities,
interoceptive constructs may also vary independently within a
given modality. For example, sensitivity may be high without
commensurate accuracy or regulation ability, such as with
uncontrollable interoceptive ‘false alarms’ often observed in
anxiety disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2006; Domschke et al., 2010).
For this reason, rather than arguing for the primacy of any
of one interoceptive construct, the present discussion uses the
term interoception to describe general processes of perceiving
body states, while also acknowledging that a variety of contextual
factors inﬂuence speciﬁc interoceptive capacities. A huge amount
of research is needed to begin to catalog the relationships between
speciﬁc capacities and modalities, let alone their plasticity and
eﬀects on well-being.
Integrating Contemplative Insights
If we could establish a working model of interoception that
accounts for diﬀerences in how interoceptive signals are
represented and managed, it is likely that some sub-systems
would be more relevant for well-being than others. It is at this
point that contemplative science and paradigms of cognitive
processing may be extremely helpful, implicating particular
interoceptive processes, addressing how interoception ideally
functions, and how such function is shaped by experience. In
particular, contemplative accounts have much to say on the
distinction between maladaptive interoceptive conditioning that
may lead to disorders, and adaptive learning that is purportedly
engendered by contemplative practices.
Here, we refer to contemplative practice in the broadest
sense, i.e., traditions of ﬁrst-person reﬂection upon or cultivation
of speciﬁc modes of experience, and focus on those practices
that explicitly involve interoceptive awareness, including types
of meditation and mindfulness-based approaches that allocate
attention to body sensations (e.g., the breath), or to speciﬁc
areas of the body (e.g., the center of the abdomen; Kabat-
Zinn, 1982), and yoga, tai chi, and other mind-body practices
performed in or outside of an explicit spiritual context
(Baer, 2003). A wealth of other body-oriented healing and
psychotherapy methods may also fall into this classiﬁcation,
such as Dialectical–Behavioral Therapy (Linehan et al., 1999),
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes et al., 1999),
and also body-mind approaches such as Feldenkrais (Buchanan
and Ulrich, 2001), Alexander method (Woodman and Moore,
2012), Focusing (Gendlin, 2012), Rosen work (Fogel, 2009),
Hakomi (Kurtz, 1997), Sensory Awareness (Selver et al., 2007),
Somatic Experiencing (Payne et al., 2015), Breath Therapy
(Mehling, 2001), Holotropic Breathwork (Grof and Grof, 2010),
and Mindful Awareness in Body-oriented Therapy (MABT;
Price, 2005). We discuss primarily practices derived from
Asian contemplative traditions, as these have undergone the
most research and been the focus for the largest eﬀort to
translate contemplative concepts into modern scientiﬁc terms.
This is not meant to exclude other contemplative traditions,
and we hope future research will be extended into other such
areas.
Classical contemplative practices such as mindfulness and
equanimity seem to speak to the issues of how interoceptive
signals are integrated into a complex representation of self
and the world beyond, and have models of how they aﬀect
health and well-being. There are, however, several outstanding
challenges to realizing the potential beneﬁts of these classical
traditions in secular modern society. The ﬁrst issue is the
lack of equivalence between traditional contemplative and
modern secular practices: although mindfulness has found a
strong representation in secular clinical therapies and sciences,
it is disputed whether this translation remains faithful to
its classical sources (Christopher et al., 2009; Grossman,
2011), and little attention has been given to the diversity of
interpretations of mindfulness within the Buddhist tradition
itself (Williams and Kabat-Zinn, 2011), which may present
competing models for interoceptive representation and function.
Second, while both clinical science and contemplative traditions
share the goal of reducing human suﬀering, they diﬀer
in scope. In modern secular contexts, practice goals are
largely pragmatic, aimed at reducing aﬀective symptoms and
improving daily function. By contrast, classical traditions
tend to orient toward more extensive change, seeking to
generate insight into the fundamental nature of reality, with
the intention of liberating individuals from their conditioned
states (Grossman and Van Dam, 2011). It is uncertain
whether current appropriations of classical contemplative
practices are suﬃcient to promote their historically lauded
beneﬁts. Given emerging evidence of contemplative practices’
eﬃcacies in secular contexts, there is reason for optimism
that at least some beneﬁcial elements have been successfully
translated (Farb, 2014). However, our understanding of these
practices’ true mechanisms of action has lagged behind the
scientiﬁc validation of their eﬃcacies. There may be central
constructs in classical contemplative theory that have yet to
be operationalized in scientiﬁc discourse, let alone empirically
studied.
Despite the great heterogeneity among contemplative
traditions, we may begin by selecting a common concept that
may contribute to scientiﬁc discourse: that of the ‘subtle body’.
Contemplative practices such as mindfulness are traditionally
grounded in traditions, epistemologies, and medical treatises
that articulate holistic rather than dualistic models of body and
mind (Mehling et al., 2011). Such traditional sources each have
their own distinct theories of the psycho-physical complex and
invoke concepts of subtle body structures and ‘currents’ ﬂowing
through those structures (Samuel, 2008; Klein, 2013). These
structures and ‘ﬂows’ are amenable to inﬂuencing and being
inﬂuenced by the mind, emotions, posture, and the condition of
the grosser (physical) body. Their presence is indicated through
awareness of a rich array of internal body sensations and a
long phenomenological history of sensate processes that relate
events occurring in the outside world to the experience within
an individual. Exploring these somatic sensations, their sources,
and their modulation has been an important focus of Tibetan,
Chinese, and Indian medicine, represented in anatomical maps
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of channels, meridians, and ‘energy centers’ (chakras: Sanskrit)
through which ‘subtle energies’ pass known as lung/ch’i/pran. a,
respectively (Loizzo et al., 2009; Klein, 2014). Every mental
event – that is, all states of consciousness- are said to ride the
‘steed of wind’ or ‘energy’ currents. It is currently unclear how
these conceptualizations map onto scientiﬁc approaches of
interoception. However, these concepts do suggest that attention
to embodied experience is signiﬁcant for self-representation
and well-being, and therefore supports the more general
hypothesis that over-dependence on top–down, or merely
conceptual (in contrast to sensory) awareness signiﬁcantly limits
a human being’s potential for relating to self, others, and the
world.
Integration Challenges
Asian classical traditions have a rich history of describing
the integration of varied interoceptive signals into a common
representation, a phenomenon often referred to as the ‘subtle
body’ (Samuel, 2008; Klein, 2013). The subtlety of this body
has to do with its typically functioning outside the horizon
of ordinary consciousness. However, as already indicated, as
the ‘steed’ or support of consciousness, it impacts perception
signiﬁcantly. We suggest that scientiﬁc discourse is just
beginning to address this question of integrated representation,
creating new possibilities for understanding what diﬀerentiates
wholesome from maladaptive integration states. And yet, there
are few empirical accounts of such integration, and so the
potential to operationalize fundamental constructs from these
traditions and practices is largely unknown. For example,
many contemplative traditions, and many practitioners, speak
of changes in the ‘ﬂow of energy,’ resulting in feelings of
lightness or heat, but it is largely unknown whether modern
psychophysiological research methods can detect such changes
(Loizzo et al., 2009; Kozhevnikov et al., 2013). Physiological
arousal itself is inherently ambiguous and highly constrained
by cognitive appraisal (Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996), and
the science of how interoceptive appraisals translate into
distinct emotional experiences is inexact at best (Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2013). Given this uncertainty, we might
begin by searching for the training-related changes described
in classical contemplative theories of interoceptive integration.
Such descriptions oﬀer a rich set of testable hypotheses
for ﬁlling this explanatory gap between physiology and
experience. Inclusion of ﬁrst-person experiences, particularly
from people with extensive training in directing and reporting on
interoceptive attention, may be an important step in developing
more comprehensive models of interoception (Gallagher, 1997;
Lutz and Thompson, 2003).
As an example of such hypothesis testing, we might consider
a classical description of the ﬁrst steps in mindfulness training.
Classical Buddhist texts, such as the ﬁfth century Path of
Puriﬁcation, describe the primary goal of early mindfulness
training is to develop stable awareness of momentary sensation,
distinguishing it from awareness of conceptual thought
(Buddhaghosa, 2010). Recent scientiﬁc investigation suggests
that the conceptualization of an experience, which may
include detailed description and analysis of events that are
associated with the experience and shaped by our collective
cultural socialization, and the actual felt, immediate experience
itself, which may arise in the body spontaneously, activate
dissociable neural networks, and that the strength of this
dissociation is indeed sensitive to mindfulness training (Farb
et al., 2007). In this way, contemplative traditions provide a
ground for distinction that is ripe for translation into objective,
neuroscientiﬁc terms. Representation of the momentary,
sensory self is relevant to practices of compassion and insight,
as well to the classic mindfulness practices that undergird
them.
Learning to attend to visceral, momentary sensation is
only one step of many in the path to well-being, and
likewise a neural distinction between immediate interoceptive
and conceptual processing is only an initial step in the
development of a scientiﬁc model. As will be discussed, access
to visceral sensations may be helpful or harmful to a person
depending on how such awareness is understood. Under the
right conditions, contemplative practices may have therapeutic
impact on health and well-being (Farb et al., 2012a), as has
been shown in experiential psychotherapy research for some
time (for a review, see Hendricks, 2001). On the other hand,
interoceptive signals may also be catastrophized in panic and
related disorders. Understanding how to skillfully relate to
interoceptive sensations, and under what circumstances they
should be attended to, is therefore a central question for
the study of interoceptive training for well-being. To progress
from a general description of interoceptive processing toward
characterizing the wholesomeness of such processing requires a
greater level of theoretical complexity, the beginnings to which
we will attempt to address.
Regulation through Simulation
A scientiﬁc model of interoception requires some description
of how diﬀuse sensory signals become integrated into a holistic
representation of the body, one that is amenable to integration
with higher-order cognition. The concept of a simulation map
provides one way to characterize such integration. An analog
of the contemplative subtle body, the simulation map is also
known as an “as–if” representation, a neural representation of
the body, a relatively stable abstraction of rapidly ﬂuctuating
sensory events (Damasio, 2003a; Seth and Critchley, 2013).
From a computational perspective, the simulation map is the
ongoing selection of encoded body states into a working
memory buﬀer that serves as the best approximation of the
body’s current state as predicted by these prior states. The
simulation map is layered, with lowest layers being closest
to raw sensory aﬀerents from the body, and higher layers
representing the aggregation of information at these lower layers
into representations that may be accessible to consciousness.
As such, the simulation map aﬀords executive brain areas with
relatively stable sensory representations from which to interpret
experience and coordinate responses. The concept of a simulation
map provides a rich canvas on which to observe the nuances
and variability in the cognitive representation of interoceptive
signals, and furthermore suggests how such representations may
be altered, both through the voluntary deployment of attention,
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and through the relatively involuntary processes of attentional
conditioning across the lifespan, such as sensory degradation in
aging (Baltes and Lindenberger, 1997).
It is important to stress that the simulation map is not identical
to current sensation, but is rather an abstraction from recent
sensory experience. Current sensation refers to the current set of
sensory inputs arriving at primary interoceptive representation
areas of the brain, most likely including the nucleus of the solitary
tract, thalamus, posterior insula, and somatosensory cortices
(Craig, 2002; Critchley and Harrison, 2013). The simulation map
on the other hand is a ﬁltered and integrated representation
of these sensory aﬀerents- it is, in eﬀect, an interpreted signal.
When considering regulatorymotivation, a central question is the
degree to which unexpected sensations are viewed as acceptable,
as opposed to problematic, deviations from one’s expected body
state.
Like many neural representations, the contents of the
simulation map may not be fully accessible to consciousness.
Of the many simulation layers, only a subset will be accessible
to conscious experience. Thus, the conscious, phenomenal map
may not be the same as the broader simulation map, although
we view the simulation map as necessary for phenomenal
bodily experience. Furthermore, there is large inter-individual
variability among phenomenal maps as a function of goals,
culture, personal experience, and possibly genetics and other
contributing factors (Ferron, 1997; Altabe, 1998; Ma-Kellams
et al., 2012; Maister and Tsakiris, 2014). These factors may
combine to limit how the simulation map is consciously accessed,
and a history of biased simulation map access may override
momentary introspective eﬀorts. Given that the simulation map
may only be partially accessible to conscious introspection, it
may be impractical to rely entirely on subjective reports to gage
individual or cultural diﬀerences in simulation map composition.
However, the simulation map may be tractably examined
at the level of neural representation, serving as a substrate
for a person’s sense of embodiment in the world. Through
investigation of the simulation map, the visceral source of our
sense of presence and our motivations toward action may be
understood.
Neuroscience techniques have helped to move beyond
subjective reports in modeling interoceptive simulation maps.
By tracking changes in interoceptive signals and subjective body
experiences during recordings of brain activity, researchers have
begun to create rich models that distinguish between bottom–
up sensory signals and top–down sensory predictions. For
example, neuroimaging research suggests that attention to the
body increases activity at the corresponding level of the spinal
cord (Nejad, 2014), suggesting that interoceptive attention may
operate even upon relatively distal aspects of the central nervous
system. Within the brain, it appears that the middle insula
integrates aﬀerent interoceptive information with exteroceptive
context into broader motivational space, but individuals diﬀer
in the degree to which such information propagates to the
prefrontal cortex, and presumably conscious awareness, as a
function of interoceptive practice (Singer et al., 2009; Farb
et al., 2012b). In addition to neuroimaging, it should be noted
that many other psychophysiological indicators of interoceptive
processing show promise for revealing interoceptive processing
in the absence of participant report, such as heartbeat-evoked
potentials (Leopold and Schandry, 2001), respiratory-related
potentials (Von Leupoldt et al., 2010), cardiac modulation of
startle (Schulz et al., 2009), or EEG-ECG single trial covariation
(Mueller et al., 2013). For example, Von Leupoldt et al. (2010)
demonstrated that respiratory occlusion produced a reliable
respiratory-related evoked potential measurable by EEG, which
serves as an index of cortical tracking of interoceptive signals.
Mueller et al. (2013) indexed interoceptive processing by the
degree to which EEG responses to task feedback predicted
subsequent heartbeat acceleration. While it is not our intention
to describe all of such techniques in depth, such methods may
provide objective indices of the impact of interoceptive signals at
diﬀerent levels of neural representation, such as the brainstem or
cortex.
Perhaps the most important application of the simulation
map is in explaining how visceral feeling promotes action.
This explanatory construct is needed in both scientiﬁc and
contemplative accounts of bodily health: analogous to the
simulation map, contemplative traditions posit the existence
of a subtle body, including various quasi-physical and delicate
elements of the body that integrate and organize visceral
feelings to provide a sense of well-being (Samuel, 2008).
Across both scientiﬁc and contemplative traditions, motivational
salience is aﬀorded to simulation maps or subtle bodies in the
form of emotional valence, with aversive or negative valence
signaling a need to return to certain adaptive homeostatic
ranges. The motivated process of achieving homeostasis, through
physiological or behavioral change, has been dubbed allostasis
(Sterling and Eyer, 1988).
In mammals, allostasis comprises many integrated functions
and includes autonomic, neuroendocrine, and behavioral
mechanisms. Much of allostasis occurs through autonomic self-
regulatory physiology- it occurs internally and automatically.
For example, we do not choose nor directly sense the dilation
of blood vessels or pupils in response to changing luminance or
emotional relevance, and yet such physiological accommodations
occur continuously to promote homeostatic ends. A complete
understanding of interoception doubtlessly requires the
modeling of these allostatic reﬂexes, especially when their
dysregulation acts as a source of suﬀering. Theories of early
contemplative practice are agnostic to the ultimate accessibility
of such responses; although direct experience of one’s visceral
stress response and its triggering conditions are essential for the
types of insights that will promote the liberation frommotivation
driven by conditioned expectations (Goleman, 2008; Hart, 2011).
At some point, simulation map theories must account for how
even subtle representations can lead to conscious insight that
promotes behavior change.
The relationship of the simulation map to Asian (especially
Indian and Tibetan) mappings of the ‘energy circuits’ within the
body bears further investigation. At this stage, we note that, like
the contents of the simulation map, many ‘energy ﬂows’ within
the body are not available to consciousness. However, these
‘energy ﬂows’ are always, in traditional theorizing, intimately
associated with consciousness. These ‘ﬂows’ are capable of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 763
Farb et al. Interoception, contemplative practice, and health
being brought to consciousness through training. As with the
simulation map, these ‘energies’ seem formative of a person’s
sense of embodiment, emotional orientation, agency, purpose,
and sense of self-worth. Unlike the simulation model, perhaps,
the mind-energy interaction is less dualistic than the visceral-
cognitive dyad that so far seems central to characterization of the
simulation map.
Leaving aside the question of how very subtle interoceptive
aﬀerents can be shaped to yield conscious insight, interoceptive
signals motivate a wealth of unsubtle, overt behavior to
satisfy allostatic concerns. Interoceptive dynamics are critical
to understanding why identical stimuli can promote divergent
behaviors. For example, a person will approach a heat source in
a cold environment but avoid it when the ambient temperature
is high. Conversely, an ice cube in one’s hand can feel pleasant
during a hot summer day but aversive in winter. The meaning of
the ice cube cannot be modeled based on the sense-perception
of the ice cube alone, but rather the coolness of the ice is
situated within a broader interoceptive milieu, one that reward
or punishes cold sensation in response to thermoregulatory
imperatives. Furthermore, allostatic cues can inform cognition
and behavior at higher levels of representation- our trust in
others is exaggerated by warm sensations and attenuated by cold
sensations (Kang et al., 2011).
If an ice cube’s value is deeply inﬂuenced by allostatic
concerns, a complete model of interoception must describe
how such inﬂuence comes about. While acknowledging that
many physiological perturbations are addressed unconsciously,
through autonomic control of the internal milieu, conscious
regulatory acts seem structured to resolve interactions between
the body and its external environment (Gu and Fitzgerald, 2014).
In this way, interoceptive signals motivate overt behavior that
feeds back upon our physiology. It is also important to note that
not all motivated behavior is allostatic: hedonic and pragmatic
goals also have a large role to play, such as sensation-seeking
to distract or regulate low mood (Taylor and Hamilton, 1997),
or self-caﬀeinating in the face of fatigue (Lorist and Tops,
2003). Thus while homeostatic demands provide a convenient
heuristic for predicting regulatory motivation, we must consider
that many of our dominant drives sacriﬁce balance in the body
to achieve other goals: riding roller-coasters, watching horror
movies, and consuming spicy or sugary foods all fall into this
category, in which extremes of arousal are intentionally provoked
and enjoyed. Interoceptive regulation thus includes more than
allostatic goals, but indeed any action intended to reshape
the sensory signals that constitute the interoceptive simulation
map. Rather than basing motivation on homeostasis, it may
be represented more ﬂexibly by how closely sensations match
predicted or desired states.
The Predictive Coding Model of Interoception
In recognition of the complexity of interoceptive processing,
the “predictive coding” model of interoception has recently
been introduced to the discourse on interoception (Seth et al.,
2011; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth, 2013; Apps
and Tsakiris, 2014). This model makes use of a ﬁnal critical
attribute of interoception, in that interoceptive processing
regularly involves a comparison between immediate sensation
and simulated past and future states. Comparison between
observed and expected or desired states may then motivate
behavior to resolve the discrepancy (Paulus and Stein, 2010;
Seth, 2013). From an evolutionary perspective, awareness
of interoceptive processes may promote adaptive behavior
(Damasio and Carvalho, 2013), and body-focused contemplative
practices may support such awareness (Mehling et al., 2011; Price
et al., 2012b). We shall argue that the predictive coding model
helps to operationalize many of the claims around the role of
interoception in contemplative practice, particularly surrounding
the deconditioning of maladaptive regulatory habits.
The idea that the simulation map can represent states distinct
from one’s current interoceptive milieu suggests that comparisons
are continuously being made within a given layer of the map,
between the current sensation of the body, and the body as
it is expected to be based upon past experience (the prior).
The simulation is constructed through the consideration of
both ongoing sensation and priors which contextualize these
sensations. Each layer of the simulation map has its own set
of priors, based on that layer’s experience with past sensory
inputs and adjustments to these priors inﬂuenced by top–
down expectancy signals. When a prior diverges from incoming
sensation, it may update the simulation at that layer, creating
a posterior probability that serves as a descending input for
lower layers of the simulation map. For example, a person
may go outside and be surprised by unexpectedly hot weather.
Such surprise may begin at lower layers of the simulation map,
promoting a response that is largely unconscious and automatic,
targeting local physiology, such as the dilation of blood vessels in
response to a rise in temperature. If rapid, automatic regulatory
responses fail to reduce prediction error (PE), a prior is updated,
forming a posterior probability that updates a lower sensory
layer in the map hierarchy to ‘expect’ hotter temperatures. It
is likely that updating of priors at lower layers of the map
is therefore itself involuntary and automatic, and not subject
to conscious deliberation or intentionality. On the other hand,
at higher levels of the simulation map, conscious deliberation
may select among several regulatory alternatives for minimizing
PE. In the hot weather example, one might choose to seek
shelter from the heat, or appraise the heat as welcome and
attempt to enjoy the warm air. Whether one selects to regulate
sensation to ﬁt the prior, or allows the prior to be updated,
is an important regulatory distinction that will be discussed
at length below. For now, the critical point is that the ability
for sensations to motivate regulatory responses is driven by
the magnitude of the PE, the deviation from the priors at a
given layer of simulation. The involvement of higher order
cognition in this resolution process is determined by how high
an error signal processes up through layers of the simulation
map before it is resolved, with larger discrepancies being more
likely to make their way up through the layers to reach conscious
awareness.
The comparison between sensed and expected states,
reminiscent of Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory (Higgins,
1987), serves two major functions: (i) to orient us to surprising
physiological changes that require immediate attention, and
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(ii) to allow comparison between current and potential future
states as a cue to action. In the face of a mismatch between
sensed and expected states, active inference promotes responses
intended to shape the interoceptive milieu to match expected
states. For example, given an unexpected headache, one may
feel an urge to take a pain-killer, in order to restore one’s
desired, habitual pain-free state. Not all active inference requires
overt behavioral intervention, or even awareness of a PE:
some forms of active inference are physiological, wherein the
autonomic nervous system regulates physiologically largely
automatically and unconsciously to return the body to its
expected state (Gu and Fitzgerald, 2014). On the other hand,
when exposed to stressors that exceed one’s autonomic regulatory
capacity, cascading PEs may reach levels of the simulation map
that are accessible to conscious awareness. Such awareness
prompts overt active inference, by which one interacts with
the environment to approach an expected state (Seth, 2013).
Critical to our deﬁnition, both physiological and overt forms
of active inference seek to reduce PE by changing sensation to
approach prior expectations rather than updating the priors
themselves.
However, active inference is not the only way to reduce the
disparity between current and desired states. One may also adjust
one’s expected state to match the internal milieu. The process
of updating the expected simulation map to more accurately
reﬂect immediate sensation is known as perceptual inference
(Seth, 2013). A person’s goals and attitudes toward interoceptive
sensation may powerfully inﬂuence the form of inference made
(Box 2).
While active and perceptual inference both seek to minimize
the disparity between sensed and expected states, they diﬀer in
their means of reducing this disparity. Overt active inference
is a process by which an organisms acts to conﬁrm/disconﬁrm
attributed causes of unexpected interoceptive sensation, whereas
perceptual inference acts to reduce the surprising nature of
the sensation by broadening sensory expectations, reducing
their inferential weight on the simulation layer. In many ways,
this distinction is analogous to the diﬀerence between modern
psychological and contemplative accounts of emotion regulation.
While modern psychological models often discuss suppression,
distraction, or reappraisal to alter the characteristics of the
interoceptive signal (Gross, 2002), contemplative traditions make
use of terms such as acceptance and equanimity, or simply
continuous non-interfering observation, as ways of changing
ones attitude toward sensation rather than attempting to change
sensation itself (Mikulas, 2011). More recent secular adaptations
of contemplative traditions almost universally feature integration
of these perceptual inference strategies.
We note that this conceptualization of acceptance or
equanimity as a ‘bottom–up’ perceptual rather than ‘top–
down’ cognitive strategy may be controversial, but believe
that this distinction is critical for understanding contemplative
BOX 2 | How motivation shapes interoceptive inference.
Given the power of interoceptive signals to alternately capture attention and provoke regulatory behavior, achieving an optimal balance between active and
perceptual inference seems central to successful self-regulation. The tension between interrogating perception and formulating a response has been addressed
in recent models of interoception processing (Hankin, 2012; Paulus et al., 2012; Seth, 2013), and we elaborate on it here to discuss the role of contemplative
practice in addressing the relatively underspecified process of perceptual inference. At the level of perception, interoception requires a mental representation of body
state as well as tactile or other related sensory information within the simulation map, which is constrained both by bottom-up sensory inputs, and by top–down
expectations based on the stored knowledge of prior interoceptive states and knowledge of one’s current context. Neither sensory afferents nor prior representations
are necessarily accessible to conscious awareness, although particular layers of the simulation map may become the objects of awareness. Motivation within the
model is generated as a response to discrepancies between the simulated and incoming interoceptive signal, which is also referred to as the prediction error or
‘surprise’ signal (Figure 1A). Incoming sensory signals are contrasted against prior information at a given level of the simulation layer. Discrepancies between the
sensation and prior feed up through simulation layers, and generally trigger regulatory activities to maintain a homeostatic state. Ultimately, prediction errors are
resolved by attributing causes to the unexpected signal, resulting in the creation of a posterior probability that cascades down simulation layers to update priors and
reduce prediction error. The posterior probability determines the meaning of the signal and consequently the nature of the regulatory response.
Interoceptive sensitivity to unexpected, afferent interoceptive signals describes how readily a prediction error propagates up through simulation layers, serving as
a basis for motivation in dynamic interoceptive representation. However, sensitivity alone does not speak to differences in how a person responds to the motivating
discrepancy signal. Top–down cognitive factors in the forms of goals, causal appraisals, and contextual cues help to shape the motivated response. The tension
between active and perceptual inference is often resolved by how one responds to the surprising mismatch between simulation and sensation. If current goals lead
one to value regulation over accuracy of the interoceptive signal, priors at lower layers will be updated with an inferred explanatory cause (the posterior probability)
from the discrepant layer that suggests overt active inference to address this cause. In this situation, surprise is minimized by down-weighting discrepant sensory
information in favor of acting to restore a previously expected state (Figure 1B). In active inference, the simulation is closely aligned with the prior, and the individual
attempts to shape incoming sensation to match the prior, thereby reducing prediction error. Conversely, if a person values accuracy over regulation, he or she will
place high weight on sensory relative to prior information, updating the posterior to create a simulation that matches the unexpected afferent sensory information
without attempting to restore a prior state (Figure 1C). In perceptual inference, the updated simulation departs from the prior and aligns with incoming sensory
information; the posterior probability updates the prior rather than prompting efforts to change the sensory input, thereby reducing prediction error. In either situation,
the discrepancy is minimized; the concept of sensory precision weighting allows the model to predict how such minimization occurs.
It is unknown how the different forms of inference will affect the distribution of priors in calculating prediction error. If perceptual inference allows for greater
updating of priors, then it will likely promote greater variability of priors than active inference, which attempts to constrain the simulation to fit an existing set of priors.
For perceptual inference, the distribution of sensory information is rendered more precise instead of the priors. These precise sensory distributions will have greater
impact on higher level posterior probabilities, which feed back upon the simulation, making it more accurate while being agnostic to its effects on the prior distribution.
If the body shows greater variation in sensation than in prior experience, then the priors will become less precise; if, however, it turns out that the body is displaying a
sensory input that is more consistent than in prior experience, then one should expect to see more precise priors following updating. It is our yet untested hypothesis
that for most people there is greater variation in the body than we tend to expect, and so the effect of contemplative practice will be to expand the range of anticipated
experiences rather than hone in on any one experience, leading to a broadening of the prior distribution. The consequence of such broadening is that the simulation
map will more accurately reflect sensory experience as it is less influenced by a rigid prior and more so by incoming sensation.
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FIGURE 1 | A prediction error (PE) model of interoceptive inference,
adapted from (Seth, 2013), in which interoceptive knowledge is
represented by three terms: priors (blue lines), i.e., the probable body
state as informed by prior events; sensation (black lines), the current
sensory input from the body; and simulation (green lines), the current
predicted body state based upon integration of current bodily feedback
and prior learned contextual influences. Critically, our model suggests that
simulation rather than raw sensation is the closest construct to interoceptive
awareness. (A) Unexpected interoceptive events, such as a stomach ache, are
represented as a PE signal that motivates a regulatory response to minimize the
error signal. The simulation distribution is displayed as equidistant from the
sensation and prior distributions to indicate the potential for updating from both
of these information sources. (B) Active inference reduces PE by weighting
priors over current sensation. A high-specificity range of expected body states
leads to large PEs from unexpected sensations, motivating attempts to modify
internal states indirectly through cognition or behavior. Successful inference
reduces PE by aligning incoming sensation to match the prior. (C) Perceptual
inference reduces simulation error by weighting current sensation over priors,
updating the simulation to fit sensation. A low-specificity range of expected
body states lessens immediate PEs from unexpected sensations, lending
interoceptive simulations (i.e., future priors) greater sensory accuracy.
Successful perceptual inference reduces PE by updating the prior to match
incoming sensation. Active and perceptual inference may co-occur dynamically
over time, shifting attention between sensory updating and regulatory response.
therapies’ intended mechanisms of action. Indeed, contemplative
therapies may be valuable precisely because they challenge
existing models of ‘top–down’ emotion regulation by introducing
the idea that sometimes attempting to control or regulate
emotional experience is itself the problem. In a system where
perception and appraisal are seemingly obligatory, iterating steps
in human experience, perceptual inference may facilitate emotion
regulation by reducing overlearned and seemingly obligatory
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perception–appraisal associations. Appraisals will still follow
perceptions, but they need not be so stereotyped and rigidly
constrained.
The distinction between active and perceptual inference
matters in everyday life: for example, consider a person
experiencing a sense of restlessness, who infers that her
unexpected restlessness stems from hunger. In this case, active
inference rapidly pairs an unexpected interoceptive signal with
an externally directed behavioral response intended to restore the
interoceptive milieu to its expected, homeostatic state. In doing
so, active inference shifts attention away from interoception itself,
at least temporarily. If it turns out that the restlessness stems from
some other source, such as workplace stress, active inference’s
promotion of a shift from interoception to regulation reduces
the opportunity to explore unfolding interoceptive signals. By
contrast, perceptual inference involves reducing reliance on prior
expectations in the face of an unexpected sensation. Through
perceptual inference, the state of restlessness becomes the new
expected state. From this perspective, the dynamic time course
of arousal may be explored, including attention to conditions
associated with changing interoceptive states. With time and
reﬂection, perceptual inference might allow the individual to
realize that her arousal was greatest when thinking about the
workplace, and that the arousal was not actually a hunger
signal. Over repeated applications of perceptual inference, prior
expectations for arousal may change so that arousal following
reﬂection on the workplace is no longer unexpected, but is
instead a familiar consequence of such reﬂection. Knowledge of
such conditioning may then aﬀord new regulatory opportunities,
a more adaptive set of priors for anticipating and explaining
physiological arousal.
If perceptual inference provides grounds for personal insight,
moving directly from an unexpected sensation to regulation
(overt active inference) may reduce the opportunity for such
insight. It is thought that such ‘knee-jerk’ regulatory responses
to emotional arousal may be a factor that drives emotional
eating behavior (Ouwens et al., 2009). In such cases, active
inference does not lead to improved interoceptive accuracy, but
instead maintains an error state. Indeed, overt active inference
may require a masking or abstraction of nuanced and rich
interoceptive signals for the purpose of promoting a rapid
behavioral response.
It is not the authors’ goal to denigrate the importance
of active inference in allowing human beings to ﬂexibly and
dynamically adapt to the world in which they are inextricably
embodied. Many unexpected sensations do require ‘doing,’ an
active regulatory response, rather than simply ‘being’ with
unexpected sensation (Williams, 2008). Indeed the most adaptive
behaviormay come from iterative cycling between perceptual and
active inferences. However, the use of active inference should
come with an oft-unappreciated caveat: it seems inevitable that
sensory granularity will be lost when one redirects attention
away from the body toward response formulation. Sensory
granularity here is understood as the ability to notice speciﬁc
details of internal sensory experience such as subtle changes in
sensation. We posit that granularity requires the capacity for
sustained attention to sensation, or least the ability to ﬂexibly
shift back and forth between sensory monitoring and conceptual
inference.
Degradation of sensory granularity is an important tradeoﬀ
in shifting to a problem-solving, active inference mode of
processing. In many cases, the ability to notice changes in
hunger and satiety levels as one eats is adaptive, empowering
feelings of satiety to terminate the eating response and maintain
homeostatic energy balance. Conversely, in our example above,
realization that a sense of restlessness was not alleviated by
food consumption is likewise important for ruling out eating
as an appropriate regulatory strategy. A failure to return to
interoceptive sensation following active inference can be seen
as a ﬁxation with a mode of ‘doing’ rather than ‘being.’ Such
ﬁxation may promote continuation of food intake and potentially
disrupt homeostatic energy balances if hedonic eating drives
are chronic (Lowe and Butryn, 2007). If one is able to respond
to unexpected sensation through perceptual rather than overt
active inference, the motivational importance of even powerful
interoceptive signals may be mitigated, allowing for deeper
inquiry and reﬂection into the conditioning underlying the
interoceptive signal. In modern secular culture, it has been
argued that the balance between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ has been
skewed toward the ‘doing’ mode; it may therefore take work
to rebalance regulatory dynamics to optimize one’s regulatory
potential (Williams, 2008). Aﬀording a transition from ‘doing’
to ‘being is consequently a primary aim of interventions such a
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal et al., 2012).
In summary, the integration of active and perceptual inference
in the predictive coding model allows for the shared inﬂuence
of secular and contemplative traditions in accounting for how
body sensation are regulated. The idea of overt active inference
ﬁts well with the existing scientiﬁc literature- the idea that we
are the curators of our bodies, needing to regulate interoceptive
perturbation. Active inference can serve a variety of ends, be
they allostatic, aiming to restore the body to its homeostatic
baseline (Craig, 2009; Gu and Fitzgerald, 2014), hedonic, aiming
to achieve some desired pleasurable, energetic or tranquil state
(Kringelbach, 2005; Paulus et al., 2009; Naqvi and Bechara,
2010), or even nihilistic, aiming for freedom from sensation
altogether, as is found in placebo-based analgesia (Büchel et al.,
2014). Perceptual inference, by contrast is often less speciﬁed in
discussions of adaptive self-regulation.
A greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying
perceptual inference is important, because high sensory
precision weighting may be one avenue by which to eﬀect
change in habitual regulatory behavior. Indeed, high levels of
sensory granularity may be critical in challenging interpretive
biases during the translation of concrete, granular levels of
the simulation map into more gross or abstract levels of
representation. Through attention to unelaborated emotional
or physical sensation, a person may discover signiﬁcant levels
of tension and/or psychological distress associated with the
body that were not previously in awareness, revealing a need
for greater self-care (Price, 2005; Price et al., 2012a, 2013).
Conversely, interoceptive attention may reveal that an allostatic
habit such as self-medication is not always necessary in the face of
noxious interoceptive sensation (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985). Recent
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research suggests that the brains of experienced meditators
demonstrate reduced PEs to passively viewed reward (Kirk
and Montague, 2015), indicative of less clinging or attachment
to positive outcomes that may serve as a basis for addictive
behavior. Constructively, perceptual inference may also make
people aware of inner resources, aﬀording access to previously
hidden capacities for calm, contentment, and appraisals that
things are going well just as they are. In this way, every moment
requires a choice between perceptual and active inference. And
yet, how does a person know which information to use or
whether he or she has enough information to act adaptively in
response to their goals? When should one switch from perceptual
to active inference? The ability to respond appropriately to
interoceptive perturbation is a challenging problem that can
serve to determine a person’s sense of well-being across the
lifespan.
With respect to the relevance of contemplative practice, a ﬁnal
point warrants mention surrounding the accessibility of active
and perceptual inference. While ideally we are presented with a
choice between the two error-minimizing responses, often this is
not the case. While active inference appears to be a ubiquitous,
evolutionarily conserved regulatory strategy (McBride, 2012),
reframing unexpected sensations as a perceptual problem may
require the cultivation of attentional capacities, intentions, and
attitudes that are less intuitive. Our bodies perform physiological
active inference even before we are born (Moor, 1968), and
learning to apply overt active inference in the form of clothing,
feeding, and otherwise caring for ourselves is a complex but
near-universal feature of childhood development. Perceptual
inference at these early stages may not be possible given limited
cognitive resources or maturity of perspective, and indeed it
may be counter-productive to an individual’s mastery of overt
active inference responses. As we mature, however, we realize
that not all unexpected sensations can be corrected, or that
our habitual, reﬂexive corrective habits are actually maladaptive.
While behavioral therapies address this problem by working to
bring such overt active inference habits to awareness so that
they may be fruitfully restructured, perceptual inference may
require development of a qualitatively diﬀerent skill set. Thus
it is important to consider that active and perceptual inferences
are not equally available, and that perceptual inference tends to
be the less available of the two without speciﬁc types of learning
experiences.
Interoception in Health, Disease, and
Well-Being
It has been proposed that mental representations of selfhood
are based fundamentally on embodied sensory experience,
supporting a sense of the self in the world that is crucial for
interacting with the environment (Seth, 2013). From this
perspective, greater accuracy of interoceptive self-representation
promotes greater moment-by-moment adaptation, whereas
dissociation from accurate representation can lead to
dysregulation. Accordingly, many contemporary health problems
involve dysregulated interoceptive processes, including aﬀective
disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2010), addiction (Naqvi and Bechara,
2010), eating disorders (Garner et al., 1983; Pollatos et al., 2008;
Herbert and Pollatos, 2014), chronic pain (Schmidt et al.,
1989), dissociative disorders (Hankin, 2012; Michal et al., 2014;
Sedeño et al., 2014), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Wald
and Taylor, 2008), and somatoform disorders (Mirams et al.,
2012; Schaefer et al., 2012). Understanding how interoceptive
processes inﬂuence representations of the self in the world and
self-regulation may lead to improved disease and treatment
models (Pollatos et al., 2005).
Presence and Agency
One approach to understanding dysfunctions in interoceptive
awareness is to apply the predictive coding framework as an
explanatory model distinguishing adaptive and maladaptive
processing. Toward this end, two extensions of the model
have been proposed, describing how inference processes
outlined above operate to minimize PE (Seth et al., 2011).
The ﬁrst of these concepts is presence: presence is thought to
arise when interoceptive and/or exteroceptive PE signals are
successfully minimized. In Seth et al.’s (2011) account, such error
minimization has been attributed to either overt or physiological
active inference; as one successfully resolves unexpected
sensation through autonomic or behavioral responses, a feeling
of engagement and connection with one’s body and environment
ensues. However, we propose that, from a contemplative
perspective, presence is accessible through perceptual inference
as well.
There are several ways that PEs may be reduced to give rise to
presence: in a virtual reality environment, interoceptive signals
may be successfully masked by salient external signals, such as
seeing oneself walking in the absence of proprioceptive motion
signals, leading to a sense of presence through acceptance of the
external signal as one’s own embodied state. Given predictable
and salient external cues in a virtual reality environment, a
sense of presence may come more easily than trying to detect
and match faint and chaotic interoceptive cues within the
noisy internal milieu. By contrast, in contemplative practice the
sense of presence through a variety of visceral experiences may
broaden the distribution of interoceptive expectations (priors),
reducing the precision of those priors, and thereby minimizing
the potential for PE. In other words, in a simulation map that
allows for great variation in sensory inputs, relatively few visceral
sensations are extreme enough to create a PE demanding a
regulatory response.
We suggest that with successful iterations of perceptual
inference, the inﬂuence of prior expectations is thereby
weakened, leading to feelings of automatic simulation map
updating: eﬀortless presence (Sjölie, 2014). While healthy
individuals likely experience such eﬀortless presence as a matter
of course, it is likely that such experiences operate across
a continuum of eﬀort, with extreme diﬃculties in achieving
presence manifesting as depersonalization and derealization
disorders (Seth et al., 2011). However, even within the healthy
population, the degree to which presence is experienced and
maintained may be dependent upon regulatory strategies and
habits. A person whose regulatory habit is overt active inference
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may spend a great deal of time pursuing idealized interoceptive
states, rather than learning to allow autonomic regulation to
more subtly achieve and maintain such states. Such a person
would require greater eﬀort to achieve feelings of presence.
Furthermore, a reliance on active inference in general may
reduce the possibility for presence when a sensation cannot be
easily mapped to an active regulatory pathway, be it through
overt behavior or autonomic regulation. In such situations,
eﬀortless presence may seem like an important but unachievable
state, similar to the ideal of accepting one’s negative thoughts
and feelings for individuals with a history of depression or
anxiety (Pauley and McPherson, 2010). For such individuals,
learning to reduce PE through perceptual rather than active
inference may constitute a radical shift in self-processing, the
introduction of a new regulation strategy based on acceptance
rather than control. It is unknown how variable feelings of
presence are in the general population; but we would hypothesize
that eﬀortless experiences of presence are ﬂeeting at best in
the frenetic, “what’s next”-paced endemic of modern Western
culture.
As an example of presence functioning adaptively, one
might imagine the perception and then acceptance of an
unexpected, transient increase in heart rate. Following the
initial upset, a person may engage in perceptual inference,
exploring the interoceptive signal, which we operationalize
as an attempt to update the simulation map to match this
signal. Acceptance would then occur when perceptual inference
successfully simulates the elevated heart rate as the normal,
expected state. By accepting the internal change, the motivational
force of the physiological change is minimized without requiring
the suppression of either expectations or interoceptive signals. By
contrast, the use of overt active inference to resolve unexpected
events has been associated with the sense of agency (Seth et al.,
2011), a feeling of control over one’s actions in the world,
that one can act to produce particular results. Agency can be
inspired both by direct regulation of bodily sensation, as well as
through changes in behavioral patterns that indirectly contribute
to one’s interoceptive state. In the context of our discussion of
interoception and well-being, the sense of agency is important
for supporting a sense of responsibility for self-regulation. This
applies both to conventional forms of overt active inference, such
as quitting a stressful job and going for a less paid but more livable
employment, but also to contemplative practices such as learning
that one can reduce feelings of anxious arousal through breath
monitoring or other regulatory activities.
Presence and agency are important in that they establish
norms for experience and control that guide behavior and
ultimately determine one’s sense of well-being. In anxiety
disorders, for instance, agency is achieved through withdrawal
from stressful situations, a form of active inference that is
eﬀective in the short term but ultimately maladaptive, as
that person never learns that the feared outcome is unlikely
to be true. In anxiety, PEs are augmented- a person may
experience a strongly aversive response to a previously neutral
stimulus (Paulus and Stein, 2006). This aversive response is
then augmented rather than extinguished when the anxious
individual makes catastrophic appraisals of the aversive sensation
that are paired with active inferences to manage these perceived
catastrophes. For example, if a racing heartbeat during exercise
is appraised as a heart attack; active inference requires a trip
to the hospital. If rapid breathing prior to public speaking is
appraised as lack of ability that will lead to embarrassment,
active inference requires social withdrawal. Faced with threats to
agency, maladaptive behaviors are reinforced, which ultimately
interferes with exploration and modiﬁcation of one’s relationship
to stressful events. From a predictive coding model, chronic
stress may lead to a reduction in the precision of PE coding
in favor of strong priors around the recognition of aversive
sensation and conﬁrmatory active inference behaviors to alleviate
that sensation. While it is unpleasant to experience unexpected
aversive arousal, it is this secondary appraisal around agency,
the threat to control over the situation that is the cause of deep
distress. The idea that higher order constructs such as agency
are at the heart of subjective well-being is a central theme of
modern appraisal theory (Scherer et al., 2001), just as presence
lies at the heart of contemplative accounts of well-being (Brown
and Ryan, 2003). These theories serve to reinforce the point
that subjective mental health stems from our inferences about
coping capacity, for which each attempt at perceptual or active
inference serves as a momentary test. If imprecise PEs prompt
ineﬃcient or maladaptive active inference behaviors, inferences
of coping failure are likely, exacerbating feelings of powerless
and ineﬃcacy and contributing to the deleterious impact of the
stressor.
In its ability to link higher order appraisals of self-worth
to momentary regulatory acts, the predictive coding framework
is helpful in understanding many other disorders, because
it suggests that well-being requires active sustenance, i.e.,
that presence and agency must be continuously constructed
through successful reduction of PE (Paulus, 2007), regardless
of the balance between active or perceptual inference. This
perspective stands in contrast to notions that isolation from our
bodies and the world is preferential except to alert us about
negative events. Instead, it is the lack of integration of accurate
interoceptive simulations into higher order representations that
is hypothesized to underlie dysregulated cognition and behavior.
In this observation there is considerable convergence with
contemplative perspectives. For example, following trauma,
some individuals may experience dissociation from bodily
experience, as is found in some forms of severe depression
and PTSD (Feeny et al., 2000). In such cases, the priors
associated with body error signals may have been linked to
traumatic experiences, which are too powerful to be actively
controlled (active inference), and too aversive to be accepted
or, as in many contemplative orientations, altered simply
by being observed (both instances of perceptual inference).
Since the error signals cannot be minimized, the simulation
map itself may be suppressed in the form of experiential
avoidance, a form of protective habituation to powerful and
uncontrollable interoceptive signals, or behavioral avoidance of
provocative situations altogether. Such inhibition may amount
to a reduction of the precision of priors in the map, so that
only very powerful sensory signals are able to trigger an upward
ﬂow of PEs toward higher simulation layers. While avoidance
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provides momentary relief from the attentional pull of PE
signals, inhibition of interoceptive awareness may also create its
own host of psychosocial issues, both through the obfuscation
of important interoceptive cues, the absence of desirable
interoceptive sensations, and the maintenance of dysfunctional
beliefs about the world and their relation to it (Paulus and
Stein, 2010). Indeed, the severity of somatic dissociation has
been linked to greater susceptibility to experimentally induced
somatic illusions, suggesting an over-reliance on prior knowledge
that interferes with current sensory input (McKenzie and
Newport, 2015). Many contemplative traditions begin from the
assumption that a suﬀering individual’s interoceptive integration
may be dysfunctional or deﬁcient; to rectify this situation,
attention to the body may delay cognitive appraisal, creating
space to restructure the integration process (Shapiro et al.,
2008).
Interoceptive Training in Clinical Practice
Speciﬁc examples of dysfunctional interoceptive integration
are myriad in psychological disorders. For instance, when an
individual with severe attachment disturbances considers close
social interaction, there is often an immediate discrepancy
between expected and actual feelings of connectedness, providing
a new source of interoceptive surprise that may be anxiously
appraised (Rector et al., 2006; Gilbert et al., 2012). Similarly, it
is not uncommon for a person with a severe history of trauma
to be so anxious that it is not possible to experience the positive
sensations of close interactions (Fogel, 2009; Frewen et al., 2012).
In the absence of new interoceptive information, such fears and
concerns may take on the quality of rumination, perseverative
thinking that is associated with aﬀective disorder vulnerability
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The predictive coding framework
provides an explanation for how rumination can dominate
attention: when simulation maps operate with low perceptual
weighting, attention is more often drawn to active regulation,
leaving little opportunity for experiences of interoceptive
presence, a feeling that a sensation is acceptable and tolerable,
that may challenge sustained bleak and dysphoric expectations.
Contemplative training is largely oriented to increasing one’s
capacity to de-habituate such coding. Commonly, such cognitive
distortions of reality may continue unfettered, leading to a
downward spiral that characterizes the chronic and recurrent
nature of aﬀective disorders (Raes et al., 2008).
And yet, despite the importance of perceptual inference
for well-being, we should stress that such inference alone is
not a panacea. Perceptual experience is not easily divorced
from subsequent appraisal, and so even accurate and precise
interoception may activate powerfully conditioned negative
associations and appraisals (Treleaven, 2009). For example, in
anorexia nervosa, patients may possess powerful associations
between awareness of bodily states associated with starvation
and a ‘doing’ mode that focuses on the control of eating, shape
and weight, ultimately culminating in interoceptive suppression
once more (Watts et al., 2007; Park et al., 2011). In anorexia,
bringing awareness to the body will initially be met with an
increase rather than decrease inmaladaptive behavior. Thus there
is a reason that interoception becomes disrupted, and skillful
guidance is particularly important in restoring interoceptive
access.
If a regulatory framework is not in place, such as the
capacity for acceptance of ambiguous or challenging sensations,
restoring interoceptive access- or advocating contemplative
intervention- could introduce new trauma. For example,
enhancing interoceptive awareness without compensatory
regulation may be maladaptive to a severely depressed and
suicidal individual or someone with acute pain from a severe
burn. In many cases, however, it seems that speciﬁcally trained,
skillful clinical or contemplative guidance can successfully
address the challenges inherent to interoceptive re-engagement.
For example, research with women in treatment for substance use
disorder suggests that when they are encouraged to discover the
connection between physiological and emotional distress, they
often learn that they have the capacity and skills to attend and
negotiate emotional stress. Enhanced interoceptive awareness
provides nuanced cues for self-care that facilitate emotion
regulation, reducing conditioned substance-use responses to
stress, and allowing such patients to maintain sobriety (Bowen
et al., 2007; Price et al., 2012b).
The need for a skillful interpretive framework is apparent in
psychometric research on mindfulness of body sensation, such
as the ‘observe’ facet of the ﬁve-factor mindfulness questionnaire
(Baer et al., 2008). This research on the questionnaire suggests
that high levels of this ‘observe’ facet are associated with
mixed health outcomes in the general population, but with
more uniformly positive outcomes in those who are relatively
trauma-free and have received a background in contemplative
training. A recently published report pointed out that the
commonly assessed ‘observe’ facet, becoming aware of bodily
changes, may change with these approaches to a much smaller
degree than the regulatory aspects of interoceptive awareness,
that is, how the body is used for self-regulation in daily life
(Bornemann et al., 2014). In this case, a multidimensional self-
report measure was suﬃcient for distinguishing between aspects
of interoceptive change, and serves as an important precedent
for further clinical research. It should be noted, however, that
the bulk of the clinical research discussed in the following
section has employed only more global qualitative reports of
interoceptive change, a ﬁnding which may in fact be driven
by training eﬀects on only a subset of interoception’s many
facets.
Clinical Examples in Patients with PTSD or
Chronic Pain
To clarify the relevance of interoception in the promotion
of well-being, it may be useful to consider examples where
the cultivation of adaptive interoception has yielded clinical
success. Emerging research suggests that contemplative practices
may powerfully support the process of interoceptive re-
discovery. In the treatment of women with a history of
interpersonal sexual violence, participants learn to engage
in perceptual inference, recognizing when sensory cues of
dissociation are triggered emotionally, allowing them to
maintain awareness of their bodies instead of dissociating from
those sensations into habitual, active regulatory responses.
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Over time, participants discover that their bodies can be a
helpful informative resource rather than a source of threat
signals that should be avoided. Thus, body sensations not
previously incorporated into awareness can be allowed into
phenomenological experience, and can be more appropriately
integrated into self-schemas. These experiences can lead
to a greater sense of safety in the world, greater ability to
engage in intimate interactions with spouse/partner without
dissociating, greater ability to negotiate stressful environments
and interactions, and lastly a greater sense of wholeness and
empowerment (Price, 2005, 2007). It remains to be determined
whether these contemplative practices increase interoceptive
accuracy directly, or instead support other elements of our
interoceptive taxonomy, such as increasing sensitivity to
interoceptive events and moderating subsequent regulatory
habits.
A further example of contemplative practices’ potential
lies in the psychological management of chronic pain, in
which the most commonly applied approach is currently a
combination of cognitive reframing by cognitive behavioral
therapy and attentional distraction (Hoﬀman et al., 2007).
Recently, however, it has been questioned whether distraction
works for chronic pain as well as it does for acute experimental
pain (Goubert et al., 2004). One reason for reconsidering
distraction techniques is that part of chronic pain pathology
may actually revolve around maladaptive fear associations
that impoverish interoceptive processing and exacerbate
pain syndromes, conditioned withdrawal associations which
distraction would only serve to reinforce rather than challenge
(Zaman et al., 2015). Instead, “interoceptive exposure” may
be an alternative (Craske et al., 1997; Boswell et al., 2013).
Yoga includes interoceptive training, is associated with
decreased prefrontal brain activity and has shown beneﬁts
for pain management (Villemure et al., 2013). Keeping in
mind concerns that interoceptive awareness is not always
beneﬁcial, helpful, or tolerable, it would seem that these and
other examples suggest that in many cases, careful guidance
of attention, informed by contemplative theory, and with
case-sensitive guidance, may allow people to reconnect
with their bodies with great therapeutic potential. With
appropriate support, patients may learn to tolerate negatively
conditioned experiences of the body, eventually accepting
their prepotent aversive response, which frees cognitive
resources for reconstruction of the appraisal process (Park et al.,
2012).
In summary, interoception is important for well-being, at a
pragmatic level of maintaining desired physiological states within
the body, but also at an epistemic level for its contributions to
perceptions of presence and agency. Indeed, many psychological
disorders are characterized by disruptions to presence and
agency in the form of dissociation or hopelessness, or by
maladaptive solutions to agency violations, as is found in
anxious withdrawal. Contemplative training may be eﬀective
to restore adaptive interoceptive dynamics that address these
violations, keeping in mind the caveat that the reframing of
interoceptive signals must be carried out with care and support
to increase tolerance for aversively conditioned sensation. How
such practices may accomplish this restorative feat is the topic of
the next section.
Contemplative Practices for Revitalizing
Interoception: The Example of
Mindfulness
Given compelling evidence that interoceptive processes are
integral to many forms of aﬀective and related disorders, we
might ask how interoception can be restored to an optimal
state. Clinical experience suggests that trusting in body signals
as potentially decision-guiding information and valuing the
body as an important resource in directing one’s behavior may
be key conditional precursors for this change (Mehling et al.,
2011). In the predictive coding framework, trust or acceptance of
interoceptive signals ﬁts with our discussion of increased sensory
weighting, perceptual inference, and the cultivation of feelings
of presence. While modern scientiﬁc traditions have much to say
about the mechanics of the body, how such mechanics can be
used to cultivate a more embodied phenomenological state has
not historically been a focus of these traditions. It is in this eﬀort
to understand the cultivation and sustenance of presence and
agency that contemplative science may be of value.
Many body-based contemplative practices involve explicit
direction of attention to interoceptive sensations. The exploration
of interoceptive awareness under many other names is central
to Asian contemplative, medical, and philosophical traditions.
Importantly, these are presented in a philosophical context of
exploring errors about the self and individual subjectivity that
result in part from ignoring, misinterpreting, or missing more
subtle levels of an individual’s interoceptive experience. Such
contemplative practices, although they may have numerous
other goals in addition to training interoceptive awareness, oﬀer
a method for training in such awareness and, in many cases,
for reorienting experience from, for example, distraction to
attentional control, eﬀort to ease, separateness to connection.
All these shifts are deemed beneﬁcial. In this section, we
will focus on mindfulness meditation traditions as they
contribute to a sense of presence through largely stationary
interoceptive attention practices. It is however important to
note that other, movement-based traditions such as yoga or
tai chi may be especially well-suited toward the cultivation
of agency. A great deal of research is needed to explore the
eﬀects of particular practices on the predictive coding of bodily
awareness.
Among contemplative traditions, mindfulness has recently
received a particularly strong representation in modern sciences.
There is an extensive literature on the health beneﬁts of
mindfulness approaches- for overviews see (Grossman et al.,
2004; Chiesa and Serretti, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2010),
particularly in the area of preventing relapse in those vulnerable
to depression (Goyal et al., 2014). It should be noted that
interoceptive training is only one aspect of mindfulness
interventions, which also emphasize changing one’s relationship
to thought content. Nonetheless, such interventions may
represent the most prominent introduction of interoceptive
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training in theWest. Mindfulness approaches may be particularly
eﬃcacious in reducing somatic dissociation from chronic pain
and sexual trauma (Price, 2007) but also in other mental health
disorders such as substance use (Price et al., 2012b) depression
(Williams et al., 2013), anxiety (Hoge et al., 2013) and eating
dysregulation (Daubenmier et al., 2011). There are suggestions
that interoceptive mindfulness practices yield changes across a
variety of cognitive domains, including self-reference (Brown and
Ryan, 2003; Farb et al., 2007; Ingram et al., 2011), attention (Jha
et al., 2007; De Raedt and Koster, 2010), emotion regulation
(Ortner et al., 2007; Jha et al., 2010), pain perception (Zeidan
et al., 2010a; Gard et al., 2012), agency (Allen et al., 2009), and
feelings of social connectedness (Hutcherson et al., 2008; Neﬀ
and Germer, 2013); see (Hölzel et al., 2011) for an integrative
review.
Modern scientiﬁc deﬁnitions conceptualize mindfulness as
an open, engaged, and non-judgmental awareness of the
ongoing ﬂux of present moment experience, including internal
experiences of sensations, thoughts, and feelings, as well as
exteroceptive sensations. It has been argued that one of the
primary and early means by which mindfulness beneﬁts its
practitioners is by anchoring attention to interoceptive signals
such as the breath or body sensation (Mehling et al., 2011; Kerr
et al., 2013; Farb et al., 2014), an idea supported by training-
related reports of both increased subjective body awareness
(Mehling, 2001) and increased strength of brain networks
dedicated to interoceptive processing (Farb et al., 2013). Focal
attention to bodily sensations is at least one method by which
mindfulness training shapes cognition (Hölzel et al., 2011); with
stability of interoceptive anchoring, practitioners also engage in
open monitoring of experience, which, from the modern secular
perspective of using contemplative practice for therapeutic
eﬀects, reveals and weakens maladaptive reactive patterns so
that they may be adaptively modiﬁed (Lutz et al., 2008; van
den Hurk et al., 2010). From a predictive coding framework,
body-focused contemplative practices may alter interoceptive
processing by shifting regulatory habits from active to perceptual
inference, increasing bottom–up integration of what is happening
in the body rather than attempting to alter body sensation to
ﬁt top–down expectations of what should happen in the body
(Pagnoni and Porro, 2014). Since even low level perceptions
of interoceptive sensations commonly rely on the integration
of both sensory and expectation processes, engaging in a
contemplative interoceptive practice may reduce the precision
of prior expectations, reducing the ability of priors to trigger
PEs in response to incoming sensations. The consequence of this
widening of acceptable sensory inputs may therefore allow for
more accurate and dynamic representations of sensation, yielding
more nuanced, and adaptive behavioral responses.
The wealth of empirical studies on mindfulness training
mechanisms makes it a useful starting point in discussing
how contemplative practices may impact interoceptive
processing. Below, we describe several domains in which
contemplative traditions such as mindfulness may positively
impact interoceptive processing, acknowledging that these
domains likely interact and support each other in an iterative
and dynamic (rather than linear) manner.
Enhanced Sensitivity
Contrary to the perceptions of even experienced meditators,
mindfulness does not appear to generally increase interoceptive
sensitivity when assessed in laboratory settings, at least where
the most popular metrics of interoceptive accuracy, heartbeat
perception, is concerned (Khalsa et al., 2008; Parkin et al., 2013).
Mindfulness may, however, increase interoceptive sensitivity
in domains that are the foci of meditative practice, such
as sensation of the breath (Daubenmier et al., 2013), or
interoceptive cues indicating the presence of subtle reactive
patterns. Even brief body-scan meditations reduce errors in
a subtle somatic signal detection task (Mirams et al., 2013),
similar to the enhanced tactile acuity related to movement-based
tai chi practices (Kerr et al., 2008). Furthermore, mindfulness
training appears to alter interoceptive attention tendencies,
focusing attention on interoceptive sensations rather than
cognitive appraisals of such sensations (Garland et al., 2012),
in keeping with a model in which contemplative practices shift
regulatory strategy from active to perceptual inference. As such,
sensitivity enhancements following mindfulness training may
constitute a kind of ‘embodied ethic’ that promotes interoceptive
attention deployment, a daily commitment to perceptual
inference rather than an enhancement of sensitivity itself
(Grossman, 2015).
One consequence of increased perceptual inference is
increased granularity of interoceptive experience, reducing the
self-appraised emotional impact of experience in favor of
enhanced clarity and sensitivity to subtle emotion provocation
(Nielsen and Kaszniak, 2006). Such sensitivity may manifest at
multiple levels of the simulation map, allowing practitioners to
recognize subtle, temporally extended dynamics of physiological
arousal, dynamics that would ordinarily be obfuscated by
deﬁnitive cognitive appraisals in response to early perturbations.
The beneﬁt of enhanced granularity is an opportunity to learn
more about one’s body and its conditioning in the world. Indeed,
mindfulness practitioners show increased accuracy between
subjective and objective measures of body sensitivity, an index
of the relative sensitivity to diﬀerent body regions (Fox et al.,
2012), and increased coherence between physiological and
subjective states (Sze et al., 2010). Such coherence allows for
greater appreciation of how stressful situations impact both
mind and body, increasing the chances of adaptive regulatory
action. Furthermore, because interoception engages the same
neural pathways supporting pro-social emotions such as empathy
(Singer et al., 2009), increased interoceptive sensitivity may also
lead to improved social function, although direct evidence for this
relationship is still needed.
Enhanced Non-Reactivity
The deeper beneﬁts of contemplative practices lie in leveraging
non-reactivity to generate adaptive regulatory insights. The
predictive-coding model can account for the availability of
such insights through the idea of precision weighting, i.e.,
how much a person divides ﬁnite metabolic and attentional
resources between (i) representing, exploring, and accepting
unexpected sensory signals, i.e., PEs, and (ii) maintaining prior
expectations. As discussed, attention can lead to greater precision
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weighting of sensation over priors, which in turn promotes
perceptual as opposed to overt active inference (Figure 1).
Both perceptual and overt active inferences require the use of
metabolic resources, as evidenced by the feelings of eﬀort when
one ﬁrst engages in either process. However, only overt active
inference engages cognitive elaboration, requiring cognitive
appraisal of the many action aﬀordances available in response
to interoceptive perturbations. Given that overt active inference
is likely to consume considerably greater metabolic resources,
individuals must attempt to optimize the precision of incoming
sensory data and priors to minimize wasted regulatory eﬀort
(Fotopoulou, 2013). Unfortunately, for individuals with strongly
conditioned regulatory tendencies, i.e., highly precise tuning
of priors, this minimization may prove diﬃcult in the face
of seemingly automatic and obligatory regulatory responses.
Resolving the disconnection between the ideal of regulatory
eﬃciency and the reality of conditioned active inference is a
non-trivial problem.
We hypothesize that one major beneﬁt of contemplative
interoceptive practice is that it provides a pathway toward
perceptual inference in the face of such conditioning, eﬀectively
relaxing appraisal tendencies. While still demanding attention,
perceptual inference frees higher order cognition to arise and
pass without particular attachment to a given appraisal of the
simulated state. In other words, perceptual inference frees higher
order resources to allow metacognition, representation of the
mind’s current state. The simple act of observation itself, as
mentioned, can create a shift, possibly even without setting in
motion higher-order resources. The idea that one’s thoughts
can be viewed as transient mental events rather than as cues
to immediate action is often referred to as decentering or
reperceiving in the mindfulness literature (Shapiro et al., 2006;
Fresco et al., 2007), and may be an adaptive consequence
of responding to arousing experiences using perceptual rather
than active inference. Decentering may also be related to the
intentional arc, which sets mindfulness practice in motion
and sustains it. Mindfulness training seems particularly well-
suited for promoting decentering relative to progressive muscle
relaxation or loving kindness interventions (Feldman et al.,
2010), perhaps due to the explicit enhancement of sensory
precision weighting at the expense of active inference. Such
decentering may not be an end unto itself, but also aﬀord ﬂexible
‘re-centering’ on habitually ignored sensations that constitute
meaningful, constructive, and positive experiences. Accordingly,
mindfulness experience has been associated with increased
cognitive ﬂexibility (Moore and Malinowski, 2009). In this way,
dedicated perceptual processing of interoceptive signals may
serve to enhance conceptual non-reactivity to experience that in
turn promotes well-being.
Enhanced Regulation
In the metacognitive space that is aﬀorded by enhanced non-
reactivity, multiple interoceptive appraisals may be observed as
arising and passing. From a decentered perspective, a person may
become aware both of her most prepotent, i.e., frequently and
powerfully occurring, appraisal tendencies, but also of alternative
appraisal options. From awareness of multiple options, ﬂexibility
of choice can be directly experienced, thereby allowing for
novel, creative, and potentially more adaptive appraisals and
actions over time. As an example, a person in a stressful
public speaking situation may use mindful attention to notice
her elevated physiological response. From this perspective,
appraisals of threat and incompetence may rapidly arise, but with
continued attention toward sensory perception, such appraisals
may also pass, interspersed with weaker, and less frequent
appraisals of potential failure, support from loved ones, and
feelings of determination. With this greater tableau of appraisals
before her, the speaker may elect to appraise her arousal as
a surmountable challenge rather than an imminent threat that
requires withdrawal from the situation. It is through this process
of forming insight that interoceptive attention may iteratively
shift engagement away from habitual appraisals to promote
experiences of insight and choice.
With practice, iterations of weighting attention toward
perceptual inference may allow an individual to more
permanently decondition and eventually replace appraisals
of environmental stressors as threat with exploration of
such stressors, appraising them instead as challenges to
be explored, a distinction with important consequences
for reducing physiological stress (Tomaka et al., 1993).
Over time, this process of overcoming habitual dysphoric
or catastrophic appraisals in favor of a less rigidly deterministic
simulation map may result in positive trajectories for
transformation, upward spirals in the promotion of well-being
(Garland et al., 2010, 2011).
One example of adaptive sensory precision weighting in
mindfulness can be found in a study of pain perception. Pain
perception is theorized to have both a sensory component,
representing the intensity and location of the interoceptive
signal, and an aﬀective component, representing the signal’s
motivational relevance in term of pleasantness or unpleasantness
(Melzack, 1975), a distinction supported by neuroimaging
research (Tölle et al., 1999). In one recent study (Farb et al., 2013),
mindful attention in experienced meditators was associated with
increased attention to bottom-up signals as reﬂected in increased
posterior insula activation, a region of primary interoceptive
representation (Craig, 2002; Farb et al., 2012b), but decreased
top–down processing as reﬂected in decreased lateral prefrontal
cortical activity, a region involved in cognitive appraisal (Ochsner
et al., 2004). These neural changes were linked to a change in
the pain experience, such that pain was perceived as similarly
intense but less unpleasant during a state of mindful attention.
In the absence of cognitive judgment, cognition may be freed
to consider alternative interpretations of sensory states. From
a regulatory perspective, such freedom allows an individual to
explore diﬀerent forms of active inference, and may perhaps even
reveal that active regulation of interoceptive signals is no longer
necessary.
Enhanced Insight
While perceptual inference, by deﬁnition, precludes immediate
cognitive elaboration on sensation, in the long term, a greater
corpus of interoceptive information provides a richer set of
data from which to investigate habitual sources of interoceptive
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perturbation, to identify the relationship between inner somatic
experience and cognitive experience, and one’s internal responses
to outside events and stimuli. This meta-cognitive awareness may
lead to insight, recognition of how events, emotions, thoughts,
and bodily sensations relate to each other (Lavie et al., 2003; Sze
et al., 2010). For example, recent studies in body ownership show
that a sense of one’s body can be manipulated by experimentally
induced visual and tactile feedback (Ainley et al., 2013; Suzuki
et al., 2013) but those with greater interoceptive accuracy (as
assessed by heartbeat detection) are less susceptible to illusions
of body-ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2011). This ‘rubber hand
illusion’ is a good example of prioritizing attention toward
priors for the interpretation of visual input over attention
toward PEs stemming from aﬀerent interoceptive signals from
the hand. For insight to occur one need not have perfect
accuracy in such interoceptive signal representation; however,
insight could emerge as a process of weighting sensory PEs
over priors, leading to a higher-ﬁdelity simulation of body state.
In theory, contemplative practices could similarly reduce false
inferences about the relationship between one’s body and the
world.
As interoceptive signals inform emotional experience,
contemplative practice may promote a cycle of awareness of the
contingencies between environmental triggers, bodily responses,
cognitive appraisals, and emotional experiences, knowledge
which can then be leveraged to regulate cognition and behavior
in the service of emotional well-being. We argue that this process
optimally occurs when interoception is viewed as foundational to
emotional experience, and thus interoceptive attention becomes a
basis for engaging in emotional processing, enhancing awareness,
and regulation of rapidly escalating emotional responses to stress.
For example, in a study for women in substance use disorder
treatment, those taught interoceptive awareness and related skills
for self-care perceived such awareness as facilitating their ability
to identify, accept, and process their emotions, key regulating
factors that they attributed to successfully preventing relapse to
substance use (Price et al., 2012a). Through these introspective
cycles, insight is fostered that radically modiﬁes inference of
interoceptive signals, toward perceptual over active inference,
exploring causal factors rather than requiring an immediate
inference and response to interoceptive causality. Despite such
enticing claims, more research is needed to substantiate the
idea that mindfulness practice helps to alter the extent to which
particular interoceptive signals are attended to and received with
ﬁner granularity in daily life.
Enhanced Presence and Agency
If the link between perceptual inference and insight can be
empirically validated, there are many downstream beneﬁts
that may ensue. For example, mindfulness’ ability to curtail
habitual reactive tendencies may enhance one’s sense of
presence and agency, and indeed mindfulness training has been
associated with increased motor control during perceptual-
motor conﬂicts (Teper and Inzlicht, 2013). Enhanced perceptual-
motor integration reﬂecting increased agency may impact
self-representations related to one’s ability to control the
environment, which may have important consequences for
one’s sense of well-being. Minimally, the increased weighting
of interoceptive signal may increase interoceptive accuracy,
decreasing the impact of dysfunctional simulations and self-
representations on cognitive and behavior, as previously
proposed (Farb et al., 2012a). For example, depression is
characterized by external locus of control, learned helplessness,
and low self-eﬃcacy, and some evidence suggests depressed
people have poorer interoceptive accuracy (Ehlers and Breuer,
1992; Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004; Dunn et al., 2007; Pollatos
et al., 2009), whereas mindfulness training appears to bolster
self-eﬃcacy (Chang et al., 2004). Furthermore, mindfulness
training has been associated with normalization of the gait
pattern of depressed individuals, suggesting concurrent changes
in proprioceptive and emotional responses (Michalak et al.,
2011). Presence and agency appears to matter for physiological
self-regulation: the rubber hand illusion, in which visual-tactile
illusions decrease a sense of ownership over one’s arm, results
in decreased skin perfusion and temperature (Moseley et al.,
2008), and increased stress hormone release in that arm (Barnsley
et al., 2011), without providing commensurate pain relief in
that arm (Mohan et al., 2012). These ﬁndings suggest that a
strategy for minimizing interoceptive PEs through substitution
of interoceptive inputs with exteroceptive inputs leads to
dysfunctional, and, in the long run, unhealthy physiological
changes in the respective bodily region. Conversely, we would
hypothesize that minimization of interoceptive PE by increased
precision weighting of sensation over priors may create a sense
of embodied presence and be able to reverse such dysfunctional
physiological changes.
Over time, an increased sense of presence and agency may
also begin to enhance higher order self-representations such as
self-esteem. Through this process, a person may hold greater
conﬁdence in his engagement with interoceptive inference, which
may in turn reinforce the exploratory cycling between perceptual
and active inference, again promoting upward spirals in the
promotion of well-being (Garland et al., 2010, 2011). It remains
to be tested whether enhanced interoceptive attention may
produce diﬀerential cognitive-emotional-physiological eﬀects
when placed in diﬀerent parts of the body and contemplative
theories may guide the formulation of such hypotheses. Future
research could examine to what extent contemplative practices
enhance a sense of presence or agency that can account for
improvements in self-eﬃcacy and related aspects of mental
health. In particular, movement practices such as yoga and tai
chi may more readily promote an increased sense of agency in
which the opportunity to explore sensorimotor signals in slow,
controlled movements is readily apparent.
Increased Positive Experiences
Another downstream consequence of enhanced interoceptive
capacity may be the ability to engage with and appreciate
pleasant sensations. In the case of mindful eating interventions,
for example, practices involve bringing greater attention to the
pleasure of seeing, smelling, tasting, and eating of palatable foods
and noticing when the satisfaction subsides, as taste-speciﬁc
satiety mechanisms become apparent (Kristeller and Wolever,
2010; Daubenmier et al., 2011). Indeed, many mindfulness
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training programs involve a raisin-eating exercise (Kabat-
Zinn, 1990), in which increased sensory precision weighting
is encouraged to decenter habitual interpretations of the
consumptive act, replaced with re-centering on unexpected
positive aspects of the experience. The ability to enter into such
sensory states and appreciate positive sensations is important,
because reduced response in the brain’s reward regions to
consumption of palatable foods such as milkshakes is associated
with increased, unwanted weight gain (Stice et al., 2010). Such
reduced activation may account for the subjective experience
of “chasing the ﬂavor” and continued eating. It remains to be
determined whether increased awareness of the pleasurable taste
of palatable foods increases reward activation and ultimately
reduces food consumption, in particular among those who are
overweight. Similarly, mindfulness-based interventions during
recovery from drug addiction appear to increase interoceptive
responsiveness to natural reward while decreasing responsiveness
to drug cues, an eﬀect correlated with reductions in drug craving
(Garland et al., 2014). As interoceptive attention broadens to
allow reactions to less conditioned cues, it appears that freedom
from maladaptive cycles of craving may follow (Khanna and
Greeson, 2013). Furthermore, classical accounts of mindfulness
training suggest that the continued exploration of experience,
including interoceptive conditioning, can itself lead to feelings
of joy and rapture (Brewer et al., 2013); the importance of such
feelings is made concrete in consideration of mindfulness’ impact
in these and other clinical disorders.
Embodied Effects
Finally, it is important to note that because mindfulness
practice itself takes place in an embodied context, engagement
with interoceptive processes may promote further physiological
eﬀects. One example common to all Buddhist traditions is the
importance of sitting posture in cultivating attentional stability
and emotional equipoise. As traditionally stated in the Tibetan
Buddhist tradition: “When the body is straight, the channels
are straight, when the channels are straight, the energies are
straight, when the energies are straight the mind is straight”
(Rinpoche, 1998). An upright sitting posture is thought to
aﬀect the movement of energy through the channels thereby
enhancing the eﬀectiveness of the meditation practice. One could
hypothesize that just sitting in this posture without engaging
in a meditative practice may have beneﬁcial eﬀects. Upright
postures are associated with enhanced physiological outcomes in
hospital patients (Convertino, 2003). And indeed, sitting in an
upright posture without actually engaging in meditation practice,
referred to as “sham meditation,” is associated with slowed
respiration rate which predicts decreased pain unpleasantness
ratings (Zeidan et al., 2010b). Another example is mindfulness
meditation’s association with increased heart rate variability
(HRV; Ditto et al., 2006), particularly in the high frequency
band, an indicator of parasympathetic activation (Wu and Lo,
2008; Krygier et al., 2013). Greater resting HRV is associated
with a host of cognitive beneﬁts; including greater sustained
attention, working memory, andmotor-response control (Thayer
et al., 2009). Thus, as the mindfulness practice itself unfolds,
mindful attention impacts physiological systems, which in turn
may feed back to inﬂuence cognitive processes in a self-
reinforcing cycle. In other words, the process of attending to
interoceptive sensations provides time for autonomic processes
to restore homeostasis, rather than perpetuating ineﬃcient or
maladaptive regulatory habits that rely on overt behavioral
intervention. Awareness of homeostasis may generate feelings
of calm, peace, and satisfaction, greater connection to others,
and a decreased desire to seek out externally rewarding stimuli
to maintain a hedonic set point. Unlike external reward, the
reward of increasingly accurate perceptual predictions may
be continuous. However, this is not to say that mindfulness
meditation predisposes one to passivemonitoring states, but such
training may increase the ability to respond more adaptively
to environmental challenges and return to homeostasis more
quickly.
Taken together, an interoceptive consequence of
contemplative practice is the decoupling of hedonic stimulus
response arcs, i.e., an increased capacity to refrain from
automatically responding to aversion with avoidance and to
pleasure with approach. This relative freedom from interoceptive
appraisal habits that drive behavior may optimize homeostasis
that becomes a self-reinforcing process. Thus, this model
may serve as a working hypothesis for the mechanisms of
action underlying how changes in interoceptive awareness
resulting from contemplative practice may enhance health
and well-being including aﬀective and dissociative disorders,
pain, and addiction. Research is needed to better understand
what diﬀerence variations in the particular foci of interoceptive
attention make toward promoting salutary eﬀects.
A Caveat on the Primacy of Interoceptive
Processing
Admittedly, it seems unlikely that contemplative training can or
should aim to engender continual and total awareness of the
panoply of interoceptive sensations present in each moment.
Instead, skillful attention to interoceptive sensation may improve
self-regulation (Bornemann et al., 2014), allowing an individual
to operate more closely to his or her optimal homeostatic state.
We have argued that increased interoceptive attention represents
one way to return to ‘being’ in a world that prioritizes ‘doing,’
restoring balance between the two. This balance may then serve
to promote regulatory ﬂexibility, with the ideal of bringing ‘ﬂow’
to experience, the alignment of being with doing in living a
meaningful and satisfying life. It may be that one reason focusing
on the body has such positive potential is that rumination, already
shown to be largely a negative factor in experience, operates, by
and large, by shifting attention to past or future (Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010). By contrast, the body is always in the present.
Attending to the body therefore anchors the mind in the present
and away from rumination. Admittedly, there are other forms of
present-centered foci that would distract from rumination such
as watching television, and the research literature supports many
short-term regulatory beneﬁts of distraction strategies (Sheppes
and Meiran, 2007; Denson et al., 2012). However, distraction
may lead to later ‘rebound eﬀects’ when a person is faced with
an unresolved stressor compared to conditions in which that
stressor was directly attended to (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).
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While more work is needed to properly distinguish the eﬀects
of attention-based regulatory strategies such as mindful attention
and distraction, skillfully attending to the stressor itself may be
the more adaptive strategy (Kross and Ayduk, 2008), and in any
case an improvement over rumination.
The Road Ahead
Other Elements of Traditional Contemplative
Approaches to Interoception
Continued dialog with representatives of traditional
contemplative practices may further explore how they
understand and modulate the ﬂow of sensations through
the body to enhance health and healing. From many Asian
medical/contemplative perspectives, disturbances or blockages
in the ‘ﬂow’ of lung/ch’i/pran. a sensations are related to disease,
and free movement of chi is related to health, as well as to
insight, kindheartedness, and other positive qualities, a central
principle of Tibetan medical literature (Loizzo et al., 2009). Their
understanding of the body is not only a matter of interoceptive
awareness; it is most explicitly a pathway for exploring and
deeply revising the sense of self, agency, and substantiality that
bears on virtually every activity in life. The import of these issues,
and their potential signiﬁcance for mental and physical health
outcomes could be a fruitful endeavor for future research.
In these Asian traditions, the interior of the body, deep in the
belly, or the heart, or deep inside the head, are all signiﬁcant
areas for focusing the mind. The mapping of channels and
the “steeds of wind” moving through them further illustrate
the body’s interiority as characterized in traditional Asian or
Buddhist perspectives. We also see that varying the locus of
attention, for example shifting one’s focus from breath to sound,
or to a particular area of the body, may produce diﬀerent results.
Contemplative traditions may have theoretical insights on
how placement of attention in certain parts of the body
aﬀects perception, cognitive, and emotional responses. Practices
vary according to whether the body is alone or in a group,
with or without direct eye contact, whether the scope of
attention includes others, whether one sits in silence or performs
movement, whether one attends to sound or focuses on other
sensory stimuli. There is also variation in the types of intentional
and cognitive framework surrounding the practice. How these
variations in interoceptive training may inﬂuence cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral processes could be tested in empirical
research.
While the focus of this discussion has largely been on the
use of contemplative practices in general, and mindfulness in
particular, to increase awareness of interoceptive processes as a
means to enhance self-regulation, other practices, such as those
found in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, involve the use of
interoceptive awareness, sometimes in combination with mental
imagery or somatic manipulations, to intentionally modulate
the ‘ﬂow’ of sensations through the channels. Importantly,
these practices take place within speciﬁc philosophical and
ethical understandings, such as believing the nature of self
and all of existence to be impermanent and interdependent.
From an integrated mind–body perspective, in which ‘currents
ﬂowing through the body’ are conceived as the energetic
support for consciousness, such “body-oriented” practices can
be a direct means to impact psychological functioning and
achieve meditative states of realization. One example is the
practice of tummo, which has been studied by scientists showing
dramatic increases in core body temperature (Kozhevnikov
et al., 2013). While the short-term physiological outcomes
of this practice have been studied for years (Benson et al.,
1982), further attention could be devoted to understanding
traditional theories of how these practices work and how
conscious modulation of interoceptive sensations, especially
when supported by accompanying intentional body-imagery,
may impact physiological and psychological functioning more
generally by promoting autonomic control of physiological
processes. Equally interesting in this regard would be a
consideration of shifts in ‘energetic ﬂows’ and related sensations
that accompany the cultivation of love or compassion, or the
use of simple sounds and their impact on mind and body. First-
person descriptions can be useful here as well, since they typically
will describe both physical andmental responses to such training.
Future Research Directions
Although we have rich contemplative traditions to draw from, as
well as new interoceptive awareness-enhancing approaches and
emerging theory from a psychology perspective, we are facing
a shortage of tools, paradigms, and appropriate measures to
rigorously interrogate and integrate them. With this challenge in
mind, we derive the following topics for further research from our
considerations:
(1) Qualitative exploration of body-based practices from
traditional contemplative traditions, and greater
understanding of Asian (and eventually other)
contemplative and medical models of the body that
involve the ‘ﬂow’ of ‘energetic currents’ through the body.
(2) Further reﬁnement of scientiﬁc conceptualizations of
mindfulness, including exploration of ﬁrst-person accounts,
to see how these match the conceptual framework for
interoceptive awareness provided here. Concurrently, we
must continue to explore traditional contemplative texts
and practice traditions for new perspectives, and to deepen
our understanding of constructs already appropriated into
scientiﬁc models of interoception.
(3) Developing and/or reﬁning appropriate quantitative
measures, objective and self-report, able to capture
cognitive, behavioral, and physiological changes occurring
with interoceptive awareness training, moving beyond
measures of interoceptive accuracy to include attention
habits, sensitivity to interoceptive cues, coherence of
physiological and subjective changes, and regulatory
strategies.
(4) Developing research designs that integrate ﬁrst, second and
third-person perspectives, such as neurofeedback, in which
third-person objective measures of physiological or neural
change provide second-person reports to the participant
in real time, potentially modulating the quality of ﬁrst
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person experience during interoceptive attention (Lutz and
Thompson, 2003).
(5) Finding appropriate ways to operationalize behavioral
interventions representing mindful interoceptive
awareness, e.g., to the breath.
(6) Deﬁning clear criteria for when or under which conditions
interoceptive awareness is beneﬁcial in treating patients
with psychiatric, psychosomatic, and pain conditions.
(7) Using neuroscience tools and technique to follow the
process/ﬂow of interoceptive information through the
brain, e.g., by EEG oscillations or with fMRI with its top–
down modulations. For example, interoceptive cultivation
should be apparent in terms of increased correspondence
between feedback-evoked EEG potentials and subsequent
physiological change. Conversely manipulation of
interoceptive signals such as respiratory occlusion following
enhanced interoception should provoke stronger and more
reliable evoked potentials.
(8) Develop longitudinal studies applying interoceptive
awareness training to patients with clinical conditions.
(9) Consider testing eﬀects of mindfulness training and other
contemplative practices on existing measures of presence
and agency (rubber hand illusion, virtual environment
experiments) to see if they mediate improvements in health
outcomes.
By improving the measurement of interoception at subjective
and physiological levels, and seeking to better understand
the coherence (and lack thereof) between these levels of
representation, it may be possible to broaden our understanding
of interoception and its connection to motivation and well-being.
Furthermore, such paradigms will help to test basic properties of
information processing in the brain, investigating how we both
predict and adjust to changing sensory stimuli, and how such
stimuli are incorporated into a broader motivational milieu.
Concluding Remarks
Interoception has in many ways been a hidden sense, perhaps
due to the challenges involved in measuring and manipulating
interoceptive signals. And yet, interoception is arguably at
least as important as the external senses, providing a sense
of embodiment in the world that is foundational to a
person’s subjective sense of well-being. Contemporary scientiﬁc
frameworks largely lack the ability to articulate contemplative
models of how energy within the body helps to determine
well-being, but, concepts such as the simulation map oﬀer an
avenue for bridging this cultural divide. Indeed, the idea of
energy or prana may one day be expressed as the allocation of
metabolic and cognitive resources to aﬀord neural representation
of body states. While genetic, social, and environmental factors
clearly have great impact on a person’s quality of life, our
goal in writing this paper is to bring to light the process by
which health and suﬀering are revealed to us in the moment,
in the hope of providing a more integrated psychological
account.
Fortunately, interest in interoception appears to be growing,
and its researchers are privileged to have access to a rich
repository of conceptual models from neuroscience, clinical, and
contemplative research traditions. The challenge for the ﬁeld will
be to pay careful attention to the claims made in each of these
traditions, to better characterize their predictions, and in doing
so to more even-handedly advance modern secular interoceptive
science while respecting the validity of all of these perspectives.
While perhaps no single researcher will hold suﬃcient expertise
in all of these domains, through collaboration such integration
is possible- we hope that the current paper and other articles
contained in the special issue is testament to that lofty but
achievable goal. It is our hope that we may all beneﬁt from
the continued study of interoception, in paralleling the advances
modern science has already made in understanding the external
world.
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